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11. Introduction
The belief in Heaven and Hell is widespread in prosperous societies (Barro and
McCleary, 2002). In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche (1999) emphasized how clever had the
Christian religion been in moralizing “the mechanism of debt in moral duty and in bad
conscience, in conscience as guilt” (discussed in Derrida, 1995, p.114). Derrida summarizes
this aphorically as “… the irreducible experience of belief, between credit and faith, the
believing suspended between the credit of the creditor and the credence of the believer”
(Derrida, 1995, p.115). Broken promises thus entail intimate suffering, due to the feeling of
guilt, and creditors often rely on this to found their belief in repayment. Similar effects
resulted from other religions. Moral codes and religions, and even other forms of ideology,
have thus emerged for enhancing the credibility of promises. Sophisticated societies have
thus found some mechanisms for enforcing contracts, while reducing the costs of punishing
default by transposing most of its repression in the spiritual or ideological sphere. Kant’s
“categorical imperative”, another form of moral restraint on disloyal behavior, thus played a
large part in founding the enlightenment, the philosophy of freedom and responsibility. Its
potential importance for economics has been highlighted by Laffont (1975). Kant explicitly
defined enlightenment as the way for human beings to escape from the tutelage of others.
Adam Smith similarly emphasized the role of self-esteem as a preferable substitute for the
pressure of others in his Theory of Moral Sentiments: “… the prudent man is always both
supported and rewarded by the entire approbation of the impartial spectator, and of the
representative of the impartial spectator, the man within the breast” (cited by Charlier, 1996,
p.278). 
Ekelund et al. (2002) discuss how the Catholic religion differentiated finely the “price
of sin”, for creating some opportunity for rent extraction in return for redemption. They
explain the “entry” of the Protestant Reformation as the emergence of a rival firm in the
redemption market, which drastically reduced the ability of the Catholic church to extract
rents from its members. This discussion highlights the fact that the enforcement mechanisms
that make broken promises more or less costly for the defaulter, and hence make
2commitments more or less credible, depend at least as much on ideological factors, as on
institutional ones like judicial courts and police, or the clergy. This fact plays undoubtedly an
important part in shaping the working of modern society. Most of the transactions take place
without litigation nor conflict, and most agents are committed to keep their promises, even
without the threat of the judiciary. Moral duty is thus an efficient substitute to the shadow of
the judge. It is well known that even gangsters obey generally a “code of honor”, which
forces them to perform certain duty, even if they reap no immediate benefit from it. Many
promises are thus kept in the real world, without the pressure of a formal institution.
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the difference that it makes, in a state of
anarchy, when the players are able to make credible promises in such a way. The economic
theory of anarchy has been recently developed by Hirshleifer (1995), using a model where
the players can use their resources either for production or for appropriation, i.e. for
capturing by force the output of others. He emphasizes the part played by the technology of
appropriation, i.e. of fighting, in shaping the social equilibrium resulting from such a setting.
In his mind, anarchy (as opposed to amorphy), necessarily involves conflict. He defines it as
follows: “… anarchy is a social arrangement in which contenders struggle to conquer and
defend durable resources, without effective regulation by either higher authorities or social
pressures” (Hirshleifer, 1995, p.27). This involves a typical waste of resources, as some
production factors are diverted from productive use, and are used up instead for
appropriation or defense. By contrast, the present model shows that an anarchical
equilibrium can emerge where no fighting takes place, for some values of the parameters. No
resources are wasted in appropriation and defense, and output is maximized, when such an
equilibrium prevails. This is done by extending Hirshleifer’s model by adding a third
technology, beside the production technology and the appropriation one, which are present
in his model. A commitment technology is added here, which allows the players to make
some promises, with a given probability of keeping their word. This probability is not
modeled as a characteristics of the equilibrium of the game, but as a personal characteristics
of each player. They promise to make a transfer, in return for refraining from engaging
resources for fighting, i.e. to pay the price of peace. The peaceful anarchy equilibrium is thus
3modeled here as a gift-exchange equilibrium, somehow related to the classic work by
Akerlof (1982). As discussed above, the subjective cost of breaking a promise depends to a
large extent on the system of beliefs present in any given society, be they religious or
ideological. There does not necessarily need to exist a third party for enforcing contracts, at
least in an institutional sense.  The effect of such a system of beliefs is captured in the model
presented below by some exogenous probabilities of the agents keeping their promises. This
is not more of a “black box” than assuming an exogenous level of labor productivity, for
example. Both encapsulate the result of complex processes of learning and understanding of
a specific type of technology. The foundations of honesty have been discussed, among
economists, by Akerlof (1983) and Sen (1976). The latter emphasizes commitment, defined in
a broader sense than here. More recently, Basu (2000) discusses this issue in an evolutionary
setting, using the concept of group selection. His argument can be adapted to the present
context as follows: honesty may emerge as a dominant characteristic, because groups with a
high enough degree of honesty can avoid violence, and thus prosper, while those afflicted
with low credibility will be decimated by internecine violence. The present paper does not
attempt to model this group selection effect, and takes as given the degree of reliability of the
promises made. Moreover, one may regard the conflict between two agents analyzed here as
a metaphor used for shedding some light on issues involving more complex players, like
ethnic groups or countries. Then, the players’ ability to commit credibly does not rest only on
purely moral characteristics. It involves in this case organizational or political systems. What
is at stake here is the modeling of a peaceful equilibrium relying on some internal
characteristics of the players, rather than on the presence of an external enforcer.
Grossman (2002) follows a different route for pulling an economy out of a state of
violent anarchy, where a fraction of the population is engaging in predation on the rest of the
population. He shows that a proprietary state whose sole function is to enforce the collective
choice to allocate resources to deterring predation may be Pareto superior to violent anarchy,
even if this state is maximizing the consumption of the ruling elite. In the words of
Hirshleifer (1995), this corresponds to the Hobbesian vertical social contract.  By contrast, the
present model may be viewed as developing the horizontal Lockean social contract, in the
4same terminology. Interestingly, Grossman  refers to the Bible, citing the people of Israel
requesting that the prophet Samuel “make us a king … [who] may judge us, and fight our
battles” (Grossman, 2002, p.31). He interprets the passage “… may judge us “ as the “request
for the enforcement of a collective choice to allocate more resources to guarding against
predators” (p.32). Another interpretation is possible for the need to establish a judge, namely
that the people of Israel had realized that their capacity to commit credibly was low at that
point in time, and that some external enforcement mechanism was needed to avoid violence.
This is the interpretation favored here, although the issue of the potential role for a
Leviathan, or any other form of third party enforcer, falls outside the scope of the present
paper. The analysis presented below is not claiming that the creation of an external enforcer
would be inefficient for correcting, or preventing, a situation of violent anarchy. It is
claiming that under some conditions, a peaceful anarchy situation can prevail, without any
external intervention.
This issue of anarchical peace is of more than purely academic interest. In the field of
international relations, for example, it bears on the problem of peace among nations, in the
absence of a supra-national, or world-wide, government. Whether or not the United Nations
Organization should see its powers extended so as to make it a world-wide government is
often discussed. While many governments from smaller countries are in favor of such a
solution, other countries, like the USA and the UK, are more reluctant to follow this path.
The issue of peace among symmetrically positioned players, in the absence of a third party
above them, is obviously relevant for this debate. In his work on “Perpetual Peace”,
Immanuel Kant tackled exactly this question (Kant, 1983). He emphasizes that such a peace
would follow if the potential opponents were signing an agreement in good faith. His
argument seems a bit outdated at first, because of its emphasis on good faith and moral
restraint. However, when this is interpreted in terms of ability to commit, it gains a renewed
interest, in game-theoretic terms. According to Kant, the ability of the governments involved
to commit would be based on two elements. First, the governments involved should have a
republican organization, by which he means having a political regime characterized by the
separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. This anticipates to some
5extent the argument of North and Weingast (1989), which bases the government ability to
commit on checks and balances, i.e. the existence of multiple veto points. Second, he relies on
commercial interests to ensure that peace brings about a larger opportunity set than war, so
that a large enough constituency exists in favor of peace in his peaceful republic. He thus
contributed to the issue of trade and conflict. A recent introduction to this field is presented
in Barbieri and Schneider (1999).
The model is presented in the next section, which also discusses its outcome in case of
fighting. It turns out that most of the properties of the anarchical equilibrium discussed by
Hirshleifer (1995) are also present in this case. However, this is not the only type of
equilibrium that can prevail in the present model. Hence, section 3 discusses the conditions
under which a peaceful equilibrium prevails instead, using a model of bargaining with a
restricted set of possible transfers. These restrictions are derived from the assumed
commitment technology. Roughly speaking, the condition for peace to prevail says that this
happens if the player who is “too rich” is “credible enough” to make a transfer workable. In
this instance, “too rich” is given a precise meaning, by reference to a benchmark case that
makes transfers unnecessary for peace to prevail. The existence of this benchmark opens the
way for an interesting solution to the credibility problem. Instead of relying on the promise
of income transfers, which is quite demanding in terms of credibility, the players can rely on
an initial gift of productive resources. This can typically be interpreted as territorial
concessions, in the field of inter-ethnic or international relations. Section 4 develops this
argument, and discusses how it provides some theoretical foundations for the endogenous
allocation of property rights at the beginning of the game. 
In both cases, be it the promise of an income transfer, or the ex ante gift of productive
resources, the rationale for giving has nothing to do with any form of altruism.
Redistribution is here founded on self interest, as peace is more profitable than war, and is
determined without neglecting the possibility of cheating, by failing to deliver the promised
transfer. The resulting peace is unarmed, and is established among symmetrically positioned
players. It can thus be labeled “eleutheristic peace”, by analogy with Kolm’s concept of
eleutheristic justice, although it does not entail the equality of income or wealth (Kolm, 1996).
6The players are equal in the deeper sense that the outcome is determined by bargaining, and
only reflects each player’s personal characteristics. They are equal in freedom, or formal
rights, and each one of them can reject the peaceful outcome, and choose war instead. Section
5 extends the result of section 3 to the case with more than two players, under several
simplifying assumptions. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model, and its Violent Anarchy Outcome
This section presents the model, and sketches the analysis of its equilibrium in case of
fighting. The comparative statics exercises performed reproduce the most important features
of Hirshleifer’s model (Hishleifer, 1995).
The Three Technologies
There are two agents in this model, indexed by { }2,1∈i . They have an initial
endowment of productive resources iN , given exogenously, which can be used either for
producing output, with a constant productivity iα , or for fighting. The quantity devoted to
the latter is denoted iF , and i’s output is thus ( )iiii FNY −=α . The quantity of resources
devoted to fighting is assumed perfectly observable by the two parties. More precisely, the
two players are assumed to know all the parameters of the model, and the only uncertainty
involved is due to the random outcome of a fight and the imperfect credibility of the players’
commitment to deliver the promised transfers.
The conflict technology is modeled here in the standard fashion, by assuming that the
probability of agent 1 winning a fight against agent 2, if any agent spares any resource for
fighting, is given by the following strictly increasing and concave function:



=
2
1
F
Fpp . (1)
Agent 2 wins with the complementary probability. This is very similar to the fighting
technology assumed in Azam (1995, 2002), Grossman (1991, 2002), Grossman and Kim
(1995), Hirshleifer (1991, 1995), and Skaperdas (1992, 1996, 2002), among others. A discussion
of this type of assumption, with a comparison with rent-seeking models, is provided by
Neary (1997). Esteban and Ray (1999) generalize this setting to more than two players, and
7bring out very clearly the link between conflict and distribution. They measure conflict by
the total amount of resources that are dissipated in the struggle for preferred outcomes.
The new feature introduced in the present model, relative to the classic literature on
conflict, is the commitment technology. Each agent is thus assumed to be able to make the
following promise: “I will give you a transfer 0≥ig  if you do not arm, i.e. keep your 0=iF ”;
however, it is common knowledge that each agent has an imperfect commitment technology,
and will only deliver the promised transfer at best with probability iλ , if the other player
does not arm. He might even give less, or with a lower probability, if he is prevented from
doing so by his budget constraint, in the worst case. With the complementary probability, the
debtor will simply default, and deliver nothing; but then, it is too late for arming. Economists
are more used to assuming the two extreme values of this type of probability than to take a
continuum of values into account, as is done here. Traditionally, in one-shot games like the
present one, game theory teaches us to assume either no commitment at all, in a
simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium, or to assume perfect commitment, in the Stackelberg
equilibrium framework. Azam (2001) contrasts the outcomes resulting from these two
extreme assumptions, in an asymmetric game where a government is facing a potential
insurgency. By contrast, in the present setting, the two players are treated symmetrically, by
assuming that no government does exist at the beginning of the game, which thus starts in a
state of anarchy, as in Hirshleifer (1995).  Azam (2002) analyzes also a symmetric model,
where involuntary transfers take place in equilibrium, because of looting and taxation, but
no gift is allowed, and no commitment problem arises.
Now, the game takes place as follows. In the first stage, the two agents meet and
reciprocally offer the contract described above to each other. If any one of the players rejects
the offer, the two sides get armed. Their remaining resources are used for producing output.
Notice that these assumptions do not allow for either side getting armed in a hidden way,
without the other side noticing. If any one of them gets armed, the other one can get armed
as well before any fighting occurs. In the second stage, either the exchange of gifts takes
place, with the known probabilities, if the contracts have been accepted and implemented by
8both parties, or the fight takes place if the two players have devoted a positive amount of
resources to arming, and the winner takes the whole output. 
The Outcome in Case of Fighting
In the latter case, the outcome is very similar to the state of anarchy analyzed by
Hirshleifer (1995). Define total output as:
)()( 222111 FNFNY −+−= αα . (2)
Then, the conflict equilibrium can be characterized as in proposition 1.
Proposition 1: If fighting breaks out, the two players get the following payoffs:
**1 YpB = (3)
and
**)1(2 YpB −= , (4)
where p* is only a function of 12 /αα , implicitly determined by (1) and:
1
2
2
1
*1
*
α
α=− F
F
p
p . (5)
Lastly, equilibrium output is then given by:
*1
* 2211 ω
αα
+
+= NNY , (6)
where, defining p’* as the derivative of p evaluated at p*, the following definition is used:
0
*
*'*
1
2
2 >= α
αω
p
p  . (7)
Proof: The best-response functions for 1F  and 2F  are determined by maximizing the
following two payoff functions, taking due account of (2):
Y
F
FpB
F 


=
2
1
1
1
max  and Y
F
FpB
F 






−=
2
1
2 1max
2
, (8)
They must thus solve simultaneously the following two first-order conditions, in the
Nash equilibrium:
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1
1
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F
Fp αα 






−=


=



. (9)
The concavity of the function p(.) is sufficient for ensuring that the second-order
condition holds. Equation (5) is easily derived from (9). The latter allows to derive implicitly
p* as a function of 12 /αα  only, using definition (1). The left-hand part of (9) is then used
along with (2) to derive (6). QED
Several comments come to mind about proposition 1. First, (6) shows that output is
less than its maximum potential value, as some resources are diverted from production, and
wasted in fighting. The coefficient *)1/(1 ω+  acts like a discount factor, applied to potential
output, and *ω  captures the rate of resource diversion due to fighting. It can be checked that
2211** FFY ααω += . Therefore, using (6), one can write:
*1
*
2211
2211
ω
ω
αα
αα
+=+
+
NN
FF
. (10)
Hence, the share of potential output which is wasted because of the diversion of
productive resources for fighting is an increasing function of *ω . Notice that this parameter
is positively related to Hirshleifer’s “decisiveness parameter”, which determines the
marginal impact on the probability of winning of an increase in the relative levels of forces
engaged (Hirshleifer, 1995). Therefore, as in Hirshleifer’s model, more resources are wasted
for fighting, the more “decisive” they are. Second, (5) embeds a result which is akin to
Hirshleifer’s “paradox of power” (Hirshleifer, 1991). Its left-hand side is an increasing
function of 21 FF , so that (5) shows that the relative engagement of forces by the two sides is
decreasing in their relative productivity. As in Hirshleifer’s analysis, this reflects the impact
of the opportunity cost of labor: the more productive side will divert less resources into
fighting than the less productive side. Lastly, (3) and (4) may be combined with the latter
result to show that the share of output obtained by each side is a decreasing function of its
relative productivity. This does not entail necessarily that its payoff has the same property,
without further specification. The impact on Y* might in some cases offset the impact on the
shares. 
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Therefore, this model leads to several familiar predictions, in the case where the
conflict breaks out. However, such an event is not necessarily the equilibrium outcome of the
game, as specified above. The next section derives the conditions for a peaceful anarchical
equilibrium to prevail instead, where the players quietly devote all their resources to
production. Then, when neither player devotes any resources to fighting, the probability of
winning or loosing is zero for both players, and the status quo prevails.
3. Peaceful Anarchy, as a Gift Exchange Equilibrium
The existence of the fighting technology in the model creates an externality, whereby
the sparing of resources for fighting by one player entails an expected loss of income for the
other player. The problem of peace in this setting is thus simply that of finding an
arrangement for internalizing this externality. The aim of the present section is to determine
the conditions for a solution based on promised transfers to be effective. It shows how low
credibility may interact with the budget constraints to make such a peaceful equilibrium
impossible. The next section will enlarge the set of possible actions, by allowing for an
unconditional redistribution of property rights up front.
The Credibility Constraint and the Violent Equilibrium
In the absence of fighting, in a peaceful equilibrium where the two sides refrain from
arming, each player i promises a transfer ig and expects to receive a transfer igˆ  with some
probability, depending on iλ  and iλˆ , the probabilities for each player to keep his promise.
More precisely, the latter probabilities are defined as the probabilities that each player
delivers either the promised amount, or the maximum that is allowed by his budget
constraint. Hence, ex post, the maximum amount that player i will deliver is
{ }iiii gNg ˆ,min +α . With the complementary probability, he simply delivers nothing. Let
ii gEEg ˆand  denote the mathematical expectations of these transfers. 
Player i’s expected utility is thus in this case:
iiiii gEgENU ˆ+−=α . (11)
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Because of their budget constraints, no player can promise a transfer whose expected
value exceeds the expected value of his income, augmented with the expected value of the
transfer received. Hence, ii gEEg ˆand  are to some extent determined jointly, in equilibrium,
as they must satisfy consistently both players’ budget constraints. Table 1 represents these
budget-constraint consistent expected values of the transfers. They are computed using the
following formula:
{ }iiiiii gENggE ˆ,min += αλ . (12)
Table 1: Determination of { }21 , gEgE
111 Ng α≤ 111 Ng α>
222 Ng α≤ 111 ggE λ=
222 ggE λ=
( )221111 gNgE λαλ +=
222 ggE λ=
222 Ng α> 111 ggE λ=
( )112222 gNgE λαλ +=
( )
21
222111
1 1 λλ
αλαλ
−
+= NNgE
( )
21
221112
2 1 λλ
ααλλ
−
+= NNgE
 
These results allow to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1: (i) Any value of 111210 NgEgE αλ≤−≤ , or of 222120 NgEgE αλ≤−≤ , can be
attained by a one-sided gift exchange;
(ii) any value of the net expected transfer strictly below these upper bounds can be
attained by a two-sided gift exchange.
(iii) no net expected transfer can be attained outside these ranges.
Table 2: Determination of 21 gEgE − .
111 Ng α≤ 111 Ng α>
222 Ng α≤ 2211 gg λλ − ( ) 221111 1 gN λλαλ −−
111 Ng α> ( ) 2221121 Ng αλλλ −− ( ) ( )
21
22211112
1
11
λλ
αλλαλλ
−
−−− NN
12
Proof: Simple calculations allow to derive table 2 from table 1. It is easily seen from this table
that the net expected transfer 21 gEgE −  is bounded from above by 111 Nαλ  and from
below by 222 Nαλ− . Moreover, it is an increasing function of 1g , and a decreasing function
of 2g , both not strictly so. This allows to derive easily the three points of lemma 1. QED
Now, the choice of peace rather than war depends on the ability of the two parties to
find a pair of promised gifts { }21 , gg  that gives them a higher expected payoff than the
prospect of fighting. If they fail to strike an agreement, the players will settle their problem
by fighting. Their expected payoffs in this case, analyzed in the previous section, determine
their outside options. 
Assume that the two players bargain over the sharing of the surplus output due to
peace. The latter is easily shown to be equal to 2211 FF αα + , i.e. the output produced by the
resources saved from being engaged in fighting. This can be called the total peace dividend.
Notice the difference with the bargaining framework discussed by Anbarci et al. (2002). The
latter use the “guns and butter” paradigm, where the players get armed first, and then
bargain to avoid the fight. Here, by contrast, the players bargain in order to avoid wasting
resources for arming. As the peace dividend is positive, there exists some possible transfers
ensuring that peace is the preferred outcome by both sides, whenever they are feasible.
Proposition 2 below spells out the restrictions that the imperfect credibility of the promises
made by the two players imposes on the set of feasible outcomes.
Proposition 2: A violent anarchy equilibrium prevails if either:
( )( )
( ) 11
2211
1 *1
**
1
N
NNp
αω
ααωλ +
++−< , (13)
or: ( )( )
( ) 22
2211
2 *1
**1
1
N
NNp
αω
ααωλ +
+−+−< . (14)
Peaceful anarchy prevails otherwise.
Proof: We know from lemma 1 and (11) that peaceful anarchy cannot deliver to each player
higher payoffs than:
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222111 NNU αλα += , (15)
and:
221112 NNU ααλ += , (16)
Then, one player or the other prefers violence to peace if either 11 UB >  or 22 UB > .
Substituting from (15) and (16), and re-arranging the terms yields (13) and (14). QED
Figure 1: The Partition of the Parameter Space
Conditions (13) and (14) show very neatly how the degree of credibility of the two
players interacts with the initial distribution of income to determine whether peace or
violence prevails in equilibrium. Notice that violence erupts even if only one of the players
rejects the prospect of peace, because of the assumption ruling out secret arming. Figure 1
depicts condition (13), and shows how it partitions the space into an area where peace may
prevail, unless player 1 chooses to arm, above the curve, and another one, where violence
erupts, at player 2’s initiative, below the curve. This diagram brings out the role of the
parameters of the fighting technology in determining the choice between war and peace. The
more decisive are the forces engaged in fighting, the smaller is the sub-set of parameter
values in figure 1 for which violence prevails. This results from the fact that the fraction of
*1
**
ω
ω
+
+p
*1
*1
ω+
− p
Peace
Violence
2211
11
NN
N
αα
α
+
1λ
1
1
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output lost because of the diversion of resources for fighting is larger, the more decisive they
are, as seen in the previous section. Hence, violence is more expensive, the larger is the
decisiveness parameter. This makes peace more attractive. A very similar diagram could of
course be drawn for representing (14), and identifying in the same way the sub-set of
parameter values for which player 1 would trigger the eruption of violence.
The Peaceful Anarchy Equilibria
Two different types of peaceful anarchy equilibria may arise in this model, because of
the restriction on transfers imposed by the lack of full credibility. The latter sets an upper
limit on the maximum payoff accessible for each player, and described by (15) and (16). This
creates “kinks” in the bargaining set, such that we may either find a corner equilibrium or an
interior one. It can be checked that the corner solution would not arise if the chosen solution
concept was the one presented by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). Let us begin by presenting
the interior equilibrium.
The most standard assumption regarding the outcome of a bargaining process is the
generalized Nash bargaining solution, introduced by Rubinstein (1982). It is used here for
solving the reciprocal gift problem of the two players. Let us now characterize this
equilibrium, before inquiring about its existence. 
If it exists, the peaceful equilibrium must solve the following maximization problem,
where 0>η  denotes player 1’s bargaining power:
( ) ( ) ηη αα −−−+−+− 12212212111, 21max BgEgENBgEgENgg . (17)
Additionally, the bargaining solution must fit in the budget constraints described
above at tables 1 and 2, which no credible promise can exceed. Using (15) and (16), together
with lemma 1, they may be written as:
( ) 12111 UgEgEN ≤−−α and ( ) 22122 UgEgEN ≤−+α . (18)
Forget the latter for a moment, and let us characterize an interior solution. The first-
order condition for the generalized Nash bargaining solution, which solves (17), may be
written as:
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[ ] [ ]11122221 )1( BNgEBNgE −−+=−+ αηαη . (19)
Examination of (19) shows immediately that some indeterminacy is involved in the
reciprocal gift exchange, as what is really determined is the difference 21 gEgE − , which
may be positive or negative. Table 2 may be used to find the different possible values of this
net expected transfer, as a function of the promised transfers. In other words, what the
generalized Nash bargaining solution determines here is the surplus of expected transfer that
the net giver, whoever that is, must promise over and above the mere compensation of the
expected value of the gift received from the other player. Cases can be constructed where the
two values of 21 and gg can be determined separately, using table 1. In general, however,
some indeterminacy remains. Then, taking due account of the budget constraints (18), as well
as the definition of the payoffs (11), allows to characterize the interior solution to this
bargaining problem as in proposition 3.
Proposition 3: A peaceful anarchy interior equilibrium exists where the two players share
the total peace dividend among themselves as follows:
( )221111 FFBU ααη ++= , (20)
and:
( )221122 )1( FFBU ααη +−+= , (21)
if and only if either one of the following conditions holds:
(i) ( ) ***11 YpN ωηα +>  and  ( )
11
1
***1
N
Yp αωηλ +−≥ , or (22)
(ii) ( ) ***11 YpN ωηα +< and   ( )
22
2
**)1(*11
N
Yp αωηλ −+−−≥ , or  (23)
(iii) ( ) ***11 YpN ωηα += . (24)
In case (iii), no expected net transfer is required, and no credibility condition is
bearing on the outcome.
Proof: In case (i), the net expected gift must come from player 1, as can be checked by re-
arranging the terms in (19), after substituting for the different variables from above. Then,
16
the net expected gift from player 1 must fulfill both (19), and the budget constraint derived
from table 2. This is only possible if the credibility constraint on the right-hand side of (i)
holds. Otherwise, credibility is deficient, and no feasible transfer can implement the interior
solution. In case (ii), the net expected gift must come from player 2, and a symmetric
argument applies. Then, it is the credibility constraint on the right-hand side of (ii) that must
hold for ensuring existence of a peaceful interior equilibrium. Case (iii) is the limiting case
between the two previous ones, and does not demand much comment. QED
Between the interior solution just described and the violent anarchy equilibrium
analyzed at proposition 2, there exist possible peaceful anarchy corner equilibria, described
in proposition 4 below. This type of equilibria is constrained by the imperfect credibility of
the promises made by the players, which makes some transfers impossible. This occurs when
the right-hand sides of either condition (22) or (23) does not hold. This type of equilibrium
would not exist if the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to the bargaining problem was used
instead of the generalized Nash bargaining one.
Proposition 4: The corner peaceful-anarchy equilibrium yields the following allocation of
payoffs to the two players. We have either:
(i) ( )221111111 )1( FFBNU ααηαλ ++>−= , and (25)
111222 NNU αλα += , with ( ) 2222112 )1( BUFFB ≥>+−+ ααη , (26)
if:
( ) ( )
11
1
11
***1***1
N
Yp
N
Yp αωηλαω +−<≤+− ; (27)
or:
(ii) 222111 NNU αλα += , with ( ) 1122111 BUFFB ≥>++ ααη , (28)
( )221122222 )1()1( FFBNU ααηαλ +−+>−= , and (29)
if:
( ) ( )
22
2
22
**)1(*11***11
N
Yp
N
Yp αωηλαω −+−−<≤−+− ; (30)
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Proof: The credibility conditions for (i) and (ii), numbered (27) and (30) respectively, are
derived immediately from (13) and (22), or (14) and (23), respectively. The comparison of the
allocation of payoffs with those of proposition 3, given by (20) and (21) are easily derived
from the fact that the relevant budget constraint is binding in each case. QED
The Role of Transfers
Propositions 3 and 4 put a lot of emphasis on the redistribution of income in a
peaceful equilibrium, and bring out the credibility constraint that bears on the set of feasible
transfers. Notice that the income condition ( ) ***11 YpN ωηα +>  in proposition 3 (i) can be
interpreted more symmetrically than it looks, as it holds if and only if
( ) **)1(*122 YpN ωηα −+−< . Hence, this case can be equivalently interpreted as requiring
1 to be “too rich”, relative to the benchmark provided by the right-hand side of the former
income constraint, or 2 to be “too poor”, relative to the latter income constraint. Case (ii) can
thus also be interpreted as requiring player 2 to be too rich, while case (iii) provides the
benchmark for the income distribution to be “just right” for avoiding peace to be dependent
on the credibility of one or the other player. This benchmark case can be understood more
easily by re-writing the allocation of income that prevails in this case, using (3), (4) and (6),
as:
( )2211111 FFBN ααηα ++= , (31)
and:
( )2211222 )1( FFBN ααηα +−+= . (32)
This benchmark income distribution is such that each player produces exactly an
income flow equal to the sum of his expected gain in case of fighting plus his share of the
total peace dividend, as determined by his bargaining power. Promised transfers are
required to ensure peace when the distribution of income in case of peace differs from this
benchmark, in the interior equilibrium. Then, the limited credibility of the players may
combine with the budget constraints to make the interior solution impossible in the cases
identified at proposition 3. The corner solution described at proposition 4 prevails in this
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case, provided the condition for avoiding violence, easily derived from proposition 2 above,
holds. Hence, proposition 2 can be re-phrased as saying that peace prevails in equilibrium
when the “too rich” agent is “credible enough” to make a compensating transfer workable. 
The corner solution requires one additional comment. In case (i), this equilibrium
involves a one-sided transfer by player 1, while case (ii) involves a one-sided transfer by
player 2, as can be inferred from lemma 1. These cases thus introduce in this model an
asymmetry between the players, which could be misleadingly interpreted as the end of
anarchy. The transfer from the “too rich” player to the other one could thus be interpreted as
a form of taxation. The “too poor” player thus could be viewed as an emerging government,
extracting a tribute from the “too rich” player, as a compensation for not engaging in
fighting. This is again akin to Hirshleifer’s paradox of power, cited above (Hirshleifer, 1991).
However, with probability 11 λ− , in case (i), or 21 λ− , in case (ii), the “too rich” player does
not deliver the promised transfer, while the other one does not impose any punishment for
that. The analogy with a government is thus quite limited. Moreover, we have seen above
that this one-sided transfer equilibrium is just an interim case between the violent anarchy
equilibria, on one side, and the interior generalized Nash bargaining peaceful equilibrium,
on the other side. Conditions (27) and (30) show that they only prevail within some interval
of parameter values. Above this range, the equilibrium transfers are generically
indeterminate, as it is only their expected difference that is determined. We have then a
continuum of gift-exchange equilibria. Therefore, there exists generically a large number of
peaceful equilibria where the two players are giving positive transfers to each other, so that
the interpretation of the “too poor” player as an emerging government, and of the transfers
as a tax, becomes somewhat contrived in these cases. It is only tenable as a limit case, when
the smaller of the two transfers tends to zero. Moreover, the existence of the corner-solution
equilibrium depends on the bargaining equilibrium concept used. It can be easily checked
that it does not occur if the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is used as the solution concept,
except again as a limiting case.
As a corollary to proposition 2, a state of violent anarchy, as described in Hirshleifer’s
paper cited above (Hirshleifer, 1995), comes out here as a special case, valid only for a sub-set
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of potential parameter values. It requires credibility to be “too low”, on the part of the “too
rich” player, for a peaceful regime to prevail in equilibrium. As peace entails a positive
surplus of output over the state of fighting, the two players would rather have the former
than the latter. Therefore, war is here predicted to occur because of a failure of the
commitment technology available to the “too rich” player. The latter is quite willing to
promise the transfer that could prevent war from breaking out, but is unable to do it in a
credible enough fashion. Fighting is thus the direct effect of a deficient commitment
technology, and not the result of any irrational behavior. 
Case (iii) of proposition 3 is particularly interesting, as it suggests that it is possible to
relax the credibility constraint, by an appropriate redistribution of productive resources
among the players, made unconditionally at the beginning of the game. In the real world,
this type of redistribution of productive resources is typically observed as territorial
concession, or other forms of redistribution of property rights over some assets. This is
discussed in the next section. 
4. Redistribution of Property Rights for Relaxing the Credibility Constraint
In this section, the players have access to an enlarged set of possible actions. In
addition to offering the contracts described in the previous sections, they can now make an
unconditional gift of some productive resources at the beginning of the game. In the case of
international relations, or of warlord competition in a collapsed-state society, this can be
interpreted as territorial concessions. This is a very common occurrence in contemporary
history. For example, in Colombia, the government has surrendered the control of a large
chunk of the national territory to the FARC, the insurgent guerrilla movement. In Africa, we
also have several examples (Reno, 1998). Charles Taylor in Liberia and Jonas Savimbi in
Angola have been left de facto in control of large parts of the national territory for long
periods of time, without any serious challenge by the government. 
At a more theoretical level, the type of initial reallocation of productive resources that
are analyzed in this section may be interpreted as the definition of property rights by the two
players before the start of the game. Whatever the initial endowment, the two players agree
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to an equilibrium distribution of productive resources that ensures a peaceful anarchy
equilibrium. This provides some eleutheristic foundations for property rights on productive
resources, insofar as they are decided by symmetrically positioned players, and are not based
either on exogenously given initial endowments, or on a coercive redistribution by any kind
of government, or other form of third party. 
The Impact of the Re-allocation of Property Rights
Let us focus on case (i) of propositions 3 or 4, where player 1 is the “too rich” one,
who must make a positive net transfer in order to avoid fighting. The other case can be
analyzed in a symmetric fashion, without yielding any additional insight. Assume now that
the credibility constraint (13) does not hold. In the previous section, this would entail that
violence would break out, triggered by player 2, with a large negative impact on incomes. In
the present section, player 1 has one more possible action, namely to make at the beginning
of the game the unconditional gift of some productive resources to player 2. Following the
same steps as in the previous section, I first characterize the resulting peaceful equilibrium,
before analyzing its existence. Define δ as the quantity of productive resource that player 1 is
so giving. Then, denote:
δ−= 11~ NN (33)
as the quantity of productive resources left to player 1 at the second stage, when the game
analyzed in the previous section begins. 
For the sake of generality, assume that the gift technology might be imperfect, so that
some costs are attached to the transfer of property rights from one player to the other one. A
simple way to capture this idea is to make the following “melting ice” assumption: if one
player parts with δ  for making a gift to the other one, the latter can only enjoy the benefit of
10, ≤≤ µδµ . Therefore, after receiving the gift, his increased stock of productive resources
is only:
δµ+= 22~ NN . (34)
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This parameterization is quite convenient for encompassing many different
situations, depending on the assumed value of µ . The standard case of a simple transfer of
property rights can be described by assuming 1=µ . However, the model can also capture
other situations, where some of the productive characteristics of the asset are lost in the
transfer. For example, in many societies the contending groups could master specific
techniques, and own specific assets, which could not be usefully transferred to the other
group. For example, the northerners in most Sahelian countries in Africa own large herds of
cattle, while the southerners practice some sedentary agriculture in tse-tse fly ridden areas.
This parasite is lethal for cattle, so that the northerners could certainly not come easily and
look after cocoa plantations in the south, were the southerners to give them up, unless they
could leave their herd behind. If the model was used to analyze the potential conflict
between two clans of nomadic agriculturists, then the main productive resource would be
family labor. This would be the case for example of those who practice the “slash-and-burn”
type of agriculture, with very long fallow periods, in open land areas. Then the rules of the
clan may preclude the gift of a son to the potentially opposing group. However, in most pre-
industrial societies, the gift of women as brides for the sons of the other groups is a common
occurrence. This model can also encompass a very different type of gift, when 0=µ . In pre-
historical times, as well as in many primitive societies in the contemporaneous world, people
used to destroy productive resources, as a sacrifice. Among the philosophers, Girard (1979)
discussed the links between the practice of sacrifice and the control of violence in different
societies. Most modern religions refer to a specific past when human sacrifice was abolished.
It seems that it is still practiced occasionally in some societies (see Touré and Konaté, 1990).
Similarly, in ancient Iran, the Zoroastrian religion was explicitly targeted at eradicating the
practice of sacrificing bulls, which could be more productively used as traction animals, and
at enhancing simultaneously the virtues of the believers. The present model sheds some light
on why the sacrifice of some productive resources might be practiced as an imperfect
substitute for the transfer of property rights on them, when the latter is not feasible. The only
difference with the previous cases, where 0>µ , is that while the “too rich” player can
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reduce his own stock of productive resources by this method, there is no simultaneous
increase in the other player’s stock. 
For determining the equilibrium condition for this two-stage game, it is also useful to
distinguish 21
~and~ BB , which define the breakpoint in the second-stage game, after the
redistribution of property rights has been performed, from 21 and BB , the payoffs from
fighting if player 1 chooses not to give up any resource ex ante to player 2, and goes for a
direct fight instead.  
If peace is to be secured by the type of gift captured by (33) and (34), the following
modified credibility constraint, derived from (13), must hold:
11
2211
1 ~
~~
1
N
NN
αξ
ααλ +−≥ , (35)
where:
**
*1
ω
ωξ +
+=
p
. (36)
Re-arranging the terms, using (33) and (34), (35) may be written as:
[ ] ( )
11
122112
1 ~
~)1(
N
NNN
αξ
µααξµαλ +−−+≥ . (37)
As 1>ξ , condition (37) can be seen as putting an upper bound on the acceptable
value of 1
~N  consistent with peace. In case of peace, player 1 will chose the minimum value
of the gift  δ  that ensures that (37) holds, as it affects his income prospect negatively. 
Figure 2 helps to understand the determination of the reallocation of property rights
on resources that secures peace when player 1’s credibility is low. The modified amount of
resources owned by player 1 after transferring the required property rights to player 2 is
measured on the horizontal axis. It is obviously bounded from above by N. His level of
credibility is measured on the vertical axis. The upward sloping concave curve represents
condition (37). Peace prevails for all the { }11 ~, Nλ  pairs located on or above this curve. Notice
that the definition of player 1 being “too rich”, the case to which the analysis of this section is
restricted, implies that:
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. (38)
Violence erupts for the whole set of points located below it. Point A is the assumed
initial situation, where player 1 is not credible enough to offer the required transfer for
securing peace, with a too small value L1λ  of his probability of keeping his word, given his
exogenous endowment 1N . Then, the minimum gift required for securing peace can be read
off the diagram as the horizontal distance of A to the credibility constraint. 
Figure 2: Determination of the Resource Redistribution
Putting (37) to equality, it can be used for computing the value of this minimum gift
of resource consistent with peace as:
[ ]
[ ] µααλξ
ααλξδ
211
22111
11 1)1(
1)1(~* +−−
−−−=−= NNNN . (39)
This minimal reallocation of property rights results in a peaceful anarchy equilibrium,
of the corner-solution type, which  allows the two players to get the following payoffs:
( ) 11111 ~~1 BNU ≥−= αλ , (40)
and:
2111222
~~~ BNNU =+= αλα . (41)
( )
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Hence, if such an outcome is chosen by player 1, it yields a second-stage peaceful
equilibrium which is supported by a one-sided expected gift from player 1 to player 2. As
discussed above, this is only the limiting case of a gift-exchange equilibrium where the gift
from player 2 tends to zero.
Peaceful Anarchy with Eleutheristic Property Rights
What remains to be proved is that the redistribution of property rights described
above results in an equilibrium. The “too rich” player 1 must compare the loss of output
entailed by reducing his initial stock of productive resources against the cost of a fight,
including that involved in diverting productive resources for that. This is dealt with in
proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5: Peaceful anarchy is preferred to the eruption of violence, even if it requires an
initial redistribution of property rights, if and only if:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )



−−+
+−−≥
1111
22111
2
1
1***
*1
1
BNpp
NN
αλω
ααωλ
α
αµ . (42)
Proof: From (39), (3), and (6), it is easily derived that:
( ) ( )
( )µααλξ
ωαµα
211
1112
1 ]1)1([*
*1*~
+−−
++−=
p
BNp
N . (43)
Substituting this back in (40) allows to write:
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1211
11111112
1 1
*/*111
αµααλξ
ωαλαλαµα
−+−
+−+−−= pBNU . (44)
It is easily checked that this is larger than 1B  if (42) holds. QED
Notice first that, because player 1 is by assumption the “too rich” one, we have:
1)1( 1 >− λξ and 1111 )1( BN >− αλ , which is useful for signing the different terms above.
Condition (42) is only relevant if its right-hand side is positive. Otherwise, violence can never
occur. It decomposes the determinants of the lower bound on µ  as the product of two terms.
The one on the left-hand side captures a relative productivity effect: the efficiency of the
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property right transfer must be higher, the less productive is the beneficiary (unless it is
irrelevant). Then a large transfer is required to have even a small redistributive effect, and
this reduces the attractiveness of such a move. The term on the right-hand side is decreasing
in the decisiveness parameter, via *ω : the larger the latter, the larger the resource cost which
can be avoided by opting for peace rather than war.  It is increasing in ( ) 11111 BN −− αλ ,
which is a measure of the extent by which player 1 is “too rich”, i.e. a measure of the
“sacrifice” that he must make to secure peace. Hence, this right-hand term is a composite
index of the cost and benefit of securing peace. A striking aspect of proposition 5 is that there
are cases where peace is always preferred to violence, irrespective of the value of µ , even
after taking due account of the required redistribution of property rights, if the right-hand
side of (42) is negative. Even the mere destruction of productive resources, i.e. performing an
old fashioned sacrifice, is enough for ensuring peace in such a case. This is partly due to the
fact that the destruction of productive resources reduces both the need to transfer income,
with the credibility problem that this raises, and the potential benefit of violence, for both
players. An interesting analogy can be made between the beneficial role of the sacrifice
analyzed here and the fact that people in Grossman (2002) prefer paying taxes for feeding the
ruling elite to the state of violent anarchy. However, this should not be pushed too far, as
Grossman’s king provides a public good by ensuring that predation is deterred. Moreover,
the sacrifice solution is ruled out if the right-hand side of (42) is strictly positive. Then, a too
low value of µ  might preclude the emergence of a peaceful anarchy equilibrium, and make
fighting unavoidable.
Therefore, this section establishes in fact a variant of the Coase theorem, under the
threat of fighting. The latter creates a special type of externality, described in the previous
section. Proposition 5 states that if the players can re-allocate their property rights among
themselves to a large enough extent before the beginning of the game, violence can be
averted in a state of anarchy, even if the contenders have a limited level of credibility in their
commitment to deliver a transfer later in the game. If the latter is too small for the “too rich”
player to be able to promise credibly a transfer in return for not engaging in a fight, then he
will give up unconditionally some productive resources before the beginning of the game,
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rather than run the risk of war. This section thus provides some foundation for an
eleutheristic allocation of property rights, which is freely decided by unreliable equals, for
securing peace. It comes closer to a true state of anarchy than the original setting used by
Hirshleifer (1995), as the players thus get rid of the influence of the implicit third party
involved in assuming an exogenous initial allocation of resources. Then, peace prevails, as
established in proposition 5.
As a corollary, the result of the present section points in the direction of the
imperfections of property rights as the root cause of violence. The crucial point is whether or
not property rights on productive resources can be given unconditionally by the “too rich”
player to the “too poor” one. In some cases, where the gift of some resource by player 1
would not benefit at all player 2 , then even the mere destruction of these assets is enough to
secure peace. However, it is clear that a higher value of µ  is preferable from a social point of
view, as the loss incurred by the “too rich” player is then compensated by the gain of the
“too poor” one, at least to some extent. Proposition 5 shows that this variant of the Coase
theorem holds even when there are substantial transactions costs, here captured by the
“melting ice” assumption, whereby a part of the resources given up by player 1 does not
benefit player 2. However, there might be a upper limit on the level of these transactions
costs beyond which violence is the preferred equilibrium.
The next section extends the model to the case of n > 2 players, with a view to
characterize further the links between anarchy, commitment, and peace. This is done after
making several simplifying assumptions.
5. Extension of the Peaceful Gift Exchange Model to  n > 2 Players
For the sake of tractability, a number of simplifying assumptions are made. First,
there is a number n of players, which are identical in all respects except for credibility. They
have the same initial endowment N, and the same productivity, normalized to 1. As in
Skaperdas’s model of warlord competition (Skaperdas, 2002), the players are located on a
circle, and can only interact with their neighbors, be it for fighting or for bargaining. The
analysis of the fighting equilibrium presented below differs from Skaperdas’s by the
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assumed random matching process. The players are indexed by { }ni ...,,1∈ , with the
convention that iin =+ . The players’ expected payoff in case of fighting is determined first,
before looking at the condition under which a gift-exchange equilibrium can secure peace. 
Fighting
The fighting technology is as follows. When the players have spared some resources
for fighting, they have to meet for doing so. Ex ante co-ordination is ruled out, and a random
matching process is assumed instead. It works as follows. (i) With probability π , player i
moves towards his higher-numbered neighbor 1+i , which he meets with probability π−1 ,
i.e. if the latter has not moved in the same direction, towards his own higher-numbered
neighbor. If such a match occurs, with probability ( )ππ −1 , the two players fight, and i wins
with probability ( )1+ii FFp , which  is  an  increasing  and  concave  function  as  assumed  in
the  previous  sections. He  then  captures  the  whole  output  of  the  two  players
11 ++ −−+ iiii FFNN .  Otherwise, he looses everything, and consumes nothing. With  the
complementary  probability π ,  he does not meet anybody for fighting, and he keeps his
remaining income iFN − , while the game  stops  here  for  him.  (ii) With probability π−1 ,
he moves towards his lower-numbered neighbor, which he meets with probability π , i.e. if
the latter has moved towards his own higher-numbered neighbor. If the match occurs, i wins
with  probability  ( )ii FFp 11 −− .  He  then  captures  the  total  output  owned by  the  two
players together i.e. ( )iiii FFNN +−+ −− 11 . Otherwise, he looses everything, and the fighting
ends. The indices used in this paragraph are meant to help the reader grasp the assumed
matching process, and some of them can in fact be dropped, as the symmetry assumption
announced above entails that iNNNN iii ∀=== +− ,11 .
Given this fighting technology, and the symmetry of the problem, one can prove the
following proposition, where ( )1'p  denotes the derivative of ( ).p  when the two sides engage
the same level of forces in the fight.
Proposition 6: In case of violent anarchy, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is such that:
i
N
FFi ∀+== ,*1
*
* ρ
ρ
, (45)
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and:
iNBBi ∀+== ,*1* ρ , (46)
where:
( ) ( ) ip ∀≥−= ,01'14* ππρ . (47)
Proof: Given the matching process described above, each player can only fight, at most, with
one of his neighbors. Therefore, agent i’s expected gain in case of violent anarchy is:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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where:
11, 2 +−−= iii FFNZ , (49)
and:
iii FFNZ −−= −12, 2 . (50)
Therefore, the first-order condition may be written as:
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Then, the symmetric Nash equilibrium requires:
*11 FFFF iii === +− . (52)
Substituting from (52) in (51), and rearranging the terms, yields (45), and (46), using
the definition of ** FNB −= . QED
Notice by looking at (47) that *ρ  is an increasing function of ( )1'p , which is in turn
directly related to Hirshleifer’s “decisiveness parameter”. Hence, (45) entails that each player
engages more resources in fighting, the larger is the latter parameter. It also follows from (46)
that the expected payoff from the fight is lower, the more decisive are the forces engaged in
fighting. In other words, this model reproduces the familiar result already discussed in
section 2 above. 
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Equation (46) in proposition 6 provides the outside option for the bargaining in which
each player engages  with his two neighbors.
Bargaining
Assume that each agent bargains in turn with his two neighbors, taking as given the
gifts that he gets from- and gives to his other neighbor. Denote +ig  the gift from i to his
higher-numbered neighbor, and −ig  his gift to his lower-numbered one. For the sake of
keeping the symmetry of the problem, all the players are assumed to have the same
bargaining power, as in the original Nash bargaining solution. Then, for every i, the
exchange of gifts must maximize:
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )** 2211111111 BggggNBggggN iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii −−−−−−−−−− −++++++−++−++++−−− λλλλλλλλ    (53)
Now, assume that the distribution of iλ  is such that the latter is bounded from below,
with iLi ∀≥ ,λλ . Then we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 7: There exists a peaceful anarchy equilibrium with:
{ }nigg
i
i
i
i ...,,1,0,0,and ∈∀>>== −+
−−++ υυλ
υ
λ
υ , (54)
if:
NL
−+ +≥ υυλ . (55)
Proof: The solution to the maximization of (53) must solve:
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )−++++++−++−++++−−− −+−=−+− 2211111111 iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii gggggggg λλλλλλλλ .    (56)
By substituting from (54) into (56) for all i, one can check that the latter holds.
Moreover, if (55) holds, then the following inequality holds:
−+−+ +≥+≥ ii
L
ggN λ
υυ (57)
for all i. It follows that the budget constraint holds for each player. QED
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Notice that (55) is a sufficient condition, and not a necessary one. The main point for
it is its simplicity. However, because −+ υυ and  are largely arbitrary, subject to the non-
negativity constraint, then (55) does not seem very stringent. It says that, in the simple
setting analyzed here, a simple gift-exchange equilibrium can secure peace in a state of
anarchy provided the least credible of the players is credible enough to promise transfers
with a positive expected value. The value of the transfers is largely arbitrary, and can be
chosen so as to accommodate even very low values of this minimal level of credibility.
6. Conclusion
The model discussed above reconciles anarchy and peace. In this framework,
unarmed peace prevails without the intervention of a government, under the condition that
people have access to a commitment technology, which makes their promises to deliver a
transfer credible enough, given the distribution of productive resources. In some cases, when
credibility is too low to ensure that peace prevails among equals, the gift of some productive
resource before production takes place can help to relax the credibility constraint, and secure
peace. Then, the anarchy equilibrium can secure peace, provided the transfer of property
rights over some productive resources can be performed effectively, even if this implies
some cost. The resulting distribution of property rights among equals is called eleutheristic,
as it results from the correction of the exogenous initial allocation of endowments by
symmetrically positioned players, who are equal in formal freedom. Even the sacrifice of
some of these resources, i.e. their destruction by one player without any benefit for the other
player, may be sufficient for securing peace in this model, in  some cases. Hence, the latter
predicts that the absence of a government triggers the eruption of violence only if the players
cannot commit credibly enough to transfer some income, and are not able to transfer
effectively enough property rights over productive resources. This approach revives a
tradition that dates back at least to Thucydides, in ancient Greece, who blamed the eruption
of the Peloponnesian war on the emergence of a condition of civil strife, which he called
stasis. The latter refers to a set of symptoms indicating an internal disturbance in both
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individuals and states. He emphasizes the overall disregard for genuinely Hellenic customs,
codes of morality, and civic loyalty (Price, 2001). 
While the analysis presented here is formally conducted in terms of individual players,
it can easily be interpreted as a metaphor that can be used in different contexts. In particular,
it seems appropriate in the field of international relations, with a view to explain why
independent countries can co-exist without being at war with their neighbors all the time,
despite the absence of a powerful third party. Then, the roots of the ability to commit
credibly to deliver some transfers need to be sought not only in the moral background of the
rulers, but more importantly in the institutional frameworks that restrain their powers in
their own countries, as suggested by the reference to Kant given in the introduction. In this
field, the word “transfer” must also be understood as a metaphor, and its meaning should be
extended to encompass many other types of concessions or agreements between states,
which potentially impose a cost on one of the parties and a benefit on the other one. Beside
aid flows and other forms of transfers, this may include preferential trade agreements (e.g.
the E.U.), privileged mining rights, fishing rights, etc.  In the real world, we observe a much
larger number of civil wars than of international wars, at least since World War 2 (Gleditsch
et al., 2002). A potential interpretation of this fact is that the Lockean horizontal social
contract analyzed here, among symmetrically positioned states, is more effective at securing
peace than the Hobbesian vertical social contract, between a government and its people. May
be governments are more credible in their promises to one another, than they are to their
people. This shows a potentially fruitful avenue for further research, aiming at identifying
the mechanisms that enhance the credibility of governments in their dealings with one
another, on the one hand, and with their people, on the other hand.
This model has some limitations, which show the way to further research. In
particular, war takes place after production in this model. This limits the catch from war to
the value of output. In a dynamic framework, wars of conquest, whereby one side could
capture some of the productive resources of the other side, with a view to get more output
later, would have to be taken into account in the analysis. A link with the theory of empire
building, as explored by Findlay (1996), thus seems to be a worthwhile avenue to explore.
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Similarly, the extension to the case of n > 2 players is here performed in a very simplified
setting, where the players are located along a circle, and can only fight or bargain with their
neighbors. The players are identical in all respects, except for the credibility of their
promises. A more general setting would have to allow for more complex interactions,
involving possibly coalitions of several players, as well as to allow for other differences
among players. This falls clearly outside the scope of the present paper, and has to be left for
future research.
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